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At its sitting of 13 September 1991, the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had referred the motion for a resolution by Mr Prag and others 
on the Arab economic boycott of Israel (83-1076/91), pursuant to Rule 63 of the 
Rules of Procedure (new Rule 45), to the Committee on External Economic 
Relations as the committee responsible. 
In a letter of 25 September 1992, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
requested that the motion be referred to it as the committee responsible, on the 
grounds that a boycott was primarily a political act. On 3 November 1992, the 
President of the European Parliament agreed to this request and changed the 
original referral. 
On 3 December 1992, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security decided to 
draw up a report and appointed Mr Piecyk rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 17 February 1993, 11 June 1993, 1 July 1993, 22 September 
1993, 13 October 1993 and 3. November 1993 the committee considered the draft 
report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 17 votes to 0, 
with 11 abstentions. 
The following were present for the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Cassanmagnago 
Cerr~tti, first vice-chairman; Sir Fred Catherwood, second vice-chairman; 
Piecyk, rapporteur; Balfe, Bertens, Canavarro, Debatisse (for Lenz - pursuant 
to Rule 138(2)), Delorozoy, Fernandez Albor, Gaibisso, Guermeur, Kellett-Bowman 
(for McMillan-Scott pursuant to Rule 138(2)), Lacaze, Langer, Llorca 
Vilaplana, Lamas (for Cheysson), Onesta, Oostlander (for Bonetti), Penders, 
Pottering, Prag (for Habsburg), Rossetti (for Dury), Sakellariou, Sonneveld (for 
Bethell - pursuant to Rule 138 ( 2)), Suarez Gonzalez (for Jepsen), Tltley, 
Trivelli and Wettig (for Newens -pursuant to Rule 138(2)). 
The report was tabled on 4 November 1993. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTI~ 
on the political aspects of t~ economic boycott imposed 
on Israel by the Arab States 
The E~ropean Parliament, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Prag and others on the Arab 
economic boycott of Israel (B3-1076/91), 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
(A3-0322/93), 
- having regard also to the report of the Committee on External Economic 
Relations on the Arab economic boycott of Israel (A3-0~39/93), which deals 






whereas since 1948, the Arab states have been implementing direct or 
indirect boycott measures against the State of Israel, which also affect 
Community firms that want to trade with Israel, 
whereas the boycott, which was initially directed against the 
establishment of the State of Israel, has with time become the symbol of 
the continued belligerence between Israel and its Arab neighbours, apart 
from Egypt, 
whereas the boycott was strengthened immediately after the Six Day War 
following the occupation by Israel of the Golan Heights, the West Bank 
(including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip and the Sanai; whereas its 
maintenance was largely the result of the continued occupation of Arab 
territories by Israel, 
whereas, after the Camp David Agreements, which resulted in the conclusion 
of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the normali:z;ation of 
relations between the two countries, Israel withdrew from the Egyptian 
territories it had occupied and Egypt ended its economic boycott of 
Israel, • 
whereas the question of the boycott must be considered in conjunction with 
the peace process which started in Madrid in 1991 , and whereas the 
Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO on 13 September 
1993 shoul~ lead to the immediate end of this boycott by the Arab States 
which had, as its motive, the refusal to recognize the right of Israel to 
exist. 
1. Recalls the Declaration by the European Council of Lisbon (26-27 June 
1992) on the Middle East peace process, in which it calls 'upon the 
members of the Arab League to lift the boycott of trade to Israel, which 
is incompatible with the spirit of the peace process'; 
2. Welcomes the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO on 
13 September 1993, creating a new momentum in the Middle East, which 
should eventually lead to a final settlement of the Palestinian question 
and moreover remove one of the main obstacles to regional cooperation 
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between the countries of the Middle East on the basis of reciprocal 
solidarity; 
3. Welcomes the negotiations between Israel and the PLO on improving access 
from the West Bank to East Jerusalem as a confidence-building measure as 
part of the peace process; 
4. Considers that a decision by the League of Arab States to lift the boycott 
would represent an important confidence-building measure which could 
advance the peace process, just as the decision by the Knesset to lift the 
ban on contacts between Israeli citizens and the PLO was taken in the 
context of the secret negotiations in Norway between Israel and the PLO, 
which led to the Declaration of Principles; 
5. Affirms that the lifting of the primary boycott is mainly a problem 
between Israel and the Arab states concerned, and that such a decision is 
a logical step in the peace process since the economic cooperation 
provided for in the Declaration-of Principles is incompatible with the 
maintenance of the boycott; 
6. Believes, as regards the other types of boycott (second-, third- and even 
fourth-degree) directly affecting Community firms, that this matter should 
be negotiated with the Arab partners within the Cooperation Councils with 
a view to ending them, so that Community firms are no longer penalized by 
the second-degree boycott, which is an obstacle to international trade, 
and also requests that any third- or fourth-degree forms which exist 
should be lifted immediately as they constitute an attack on human rights; 
7. Insists that the continuation of the boycott can only damage the relations 
of the European Union and its Member States with the countries imposing 
it; 
8. Urges the Commission to propose preventive legal arrangements which would 
enable the European Union, on the basis of political criteria drawn up by 
the Council and/or European Political Cooperation, to protect Community 
companies from any boycott measures imposed on them by third countries; 
9. 
1 0. 
Welcomes the fact that the European Union intends to play an active role 
in supporting and monitoring the current Middle East peace process, in 
particular by encouraging close cooperation between Stat~s in the region, 
the possible outcome of which could be the establishmept of a common 
Calls for the European Union: \ market; 
to play a still more active part in the Middle East peace process, 
particularly in the multilateral peace negotiations; 
to collaborate as of now on the establishment of a development plan 
for the region, with a view to a peaceful settlement; 
to hold out the prospect of finance to promote cooperation between all 
the countries of the region, which will be essential for development 
in such areas as water management, infrastructure, tourism and so on; 
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11. Points out that this active role will only be useful artd credible if the 
European Union. maintains a form of economic and development policy 
cooperation based on common principles with all the rel~vant countries of 
the region taking part in the multilateral peace negotiations; 
12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Council, the !staeli Government and Parliament, the Secretary-General of 
the League of Arab States and the Secret~ry-General of the Arab Inter-
Parliamentary Union. 
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1. The motion for a resolution (B3-1 076/91) tabled by Mr Prag and others 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure on the Arab economic boycott of 
Israel raises a difficult political problem which must be seen in the light of 
the peace process currently under way in the Middle East and, in particular, the 
Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO on 13 September 1993 in 
Washington. 
2. In the motion for a resolution, the authors consider that the boycott 
imposed by twelve members of the Arab League against Israel constitutes 
unacceptable interference in EC affairs (since firms which do business with 
Israel are prohibited from trading with the Arab countries). They add that the 
secondary and tertiary boycotts are also 'entirely contrary to the spirit and 
letter of the agreements concluded by the Community with the Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries'. Lastly, the authors reject the discrimination of race and religion 
which the boycott produces. They therefore call on the Commission to propose 
measures outlawing and effectively combating all the unacceptable aspects of the 
boycott. 
3. A boycott is a hindrance to free trade, authorized by international law, 
in the same way as an embargo. It is a means of pressure or of non-violent 
retaliation duly decided on by countries at war and accepted in international 
law. It is a measure allowed by Article XXI of GATT. 
4. The Arab boycott of Israel began even before the State of Israel was 
founded, xn response to the boycott of Arab workers on the lands acquired in 
Palestine by the Jewish National Fund. Its aim was to weaken economically the 
colonies being established in those lands with the avowed aim of creating a 
Jewish state in Palestine. 
5. The boycott, coordinated by the League of Arab States, came into being 
officially in December 1945. It was stepped up in 1948 and then again in 1951 
when the League of Arab States adopted a recommendation in response to Israel's 
refusal to allow the 750 000 Palestinian refugees of 1948 to return to their 
lands or provide them with due compensation in accordance with Resolution 194 
of the United Nations Security Council (11 December 1948). The following year, 
the Arab League set up a boycott bureau in Damascus. This bureau still exists. 
6. The Arab boycott was stepped up considerably by the Arab States in direct 
conflict with Israel following Israel's occupation in 1967 of the whole of 
Palestine, the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai and after Israel 
began to establish settlements in those areas in breach of Article 49 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention to which it is a signatory. Following the Israeli 
occupation, many decrees issued by the military authorities have made the 
territories totally dependent on the Israeli economy while at the same time 
preventing the Palestinian economy from competing with the Israeli economy. The 
Israeli authorities have not allowed Palestinian firms to import directly 
products purchased on the international market, particularly the European 
market, and have long been opposed to the export of Palestinian products to 
Europe. Thus, the official Israeli organization for agricultural exports is 
putting pressure on potential European importers of Palestinian products to 
boycott such products. 
7. The Arab boycott operates on two official levels: 
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primary boycott: the Arab countries refrain from trading directly with 
Israel; 
secondary boycott: 
which, because of 
strengthen Israel's 
the Arab countries refuse to trade with certain firms 
the scale or nature of links with Israel, would 
military-economic potential. 
8. In addition, the boycott of Israel appears to operate on two other levels. 
First, there is a de facto third level of boycott for which the boycott bureau 
does not make provision and which it does not monitor: certain firms avoid doing 
business with other firms which are reputed to be included on the black list. 
Lastly, according to the Anti-Boycott Department of the . Israeli Foreign 
Ministry, there is a kind of fourth-degree personal boycott aimed at companies 
whose senior executives include prominent Jews. The Arab League nevertheless 
denies that such a boycott exists. 
9. In 1977 the US Congress adopted a law (known as the Export Administration 
Act) providing for a company practising a boycott not decided on by the United 
States towards a friendly country to be prosecuted. This law was clearly 
targeted at the Arab boycott of Israel. Since then, the United States have 
tried to encourage European countries to adopt similar laws. 
10. Following various initiatives by the World Jewish Congress, the Commission 
of the European Communities carried out an inquiry into the boycott based on 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 17/62. From the information compiled during the 
inquiry, which was completed in 1982, Community trade did not appear to have 
been substantially affected by the boycott measures undertaken by the Arab 
States. No action was therefore taken following the inquiry. Moreover, there 
have been no specific complaints made in connection with the implementation of 
the rules of competition of the EEC Treaty or implementation of the bilateral 
agreements concluded between the Community and most of the Mediterranean 
countries. 
11. Two European countries have adopted 'anti-boycott' laws which in practice, 
however, have hardly been applied: France (in 1977, with an amendment to the law 
in 1981 ) and Germany (in 1990) . A bill was also debated in 1982 in the 
Netherlands but was rejected. 
12. It is undeniable that the Arab boycott is affecting the Israeli economy but 
the only information available in this connection is one-sided. A study by the 
Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce published in 1992 by the Jerusalem 
Post puts foreign investment losses and Israeli trade opportunities lost as a 
result of the Arab boycott at US $ 45 billion for the period 1952-1992. 
13. The recommendations of the boycott Bureau have never been uniformly applied 
by the Arab countries and the boycott itself has become less rigid in recent 
years. Moreover, Egypt no longer applies the boycott. ·In actual fact, the 
boycott is now only applied by those Middle Eastern Arab countries for which the 
Palestinian issue is particularly sensitive owing to their proximity to the 
conflict zone. 
14. Following the recent Gulf War, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries 
proposed to lift the boycott in exchange for a total freeze on Israeli 
settlements in the Occupied Territories. 
15. This matter is still under negotiation between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours, which have on many occasions declared themselves prepared to lift 
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the boycott in exchange for genuine concessions on the part of Israel. The 
twelve Community Member States for their part have repeatedly called for Israeli 
confidence-building measures to go hand-in-hand with a lifting of the boycott. 
16. All this goes to show that the Arab boycott of Israel requires a political 
solution which is therefore closely link~d to the peace process currently under 
way. 
17. The report by Mr Sonneveld, rapporteur for the Committee on External 
Economic Relations (A3-0239/93), looked at the commercial aspects of the Arab 
boycott in considerable detail. It focused in particular on the effects of the 
boycott from the point of view of Community legislation. It also showed that 
the United States anti-boycott legislation contained in the 1977 Export 
Administration Act (EAA) has not had any adverse effects on US trade. However, 
it should be pointed out that this law provides for exemptions which rob it 
somewhat of its impact. 
18. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security refers to the declaration of 
the Lisbon European Council (26-27 June 1992) on the Middle East peace process 
which called on 'the members of the Arab League to lift the boycott of trade to 
Israel, which is incompatible with the spirit of the peace process'. However, 
in that declaration, the European Council stipulated the conditions which might 
lead to peace. 
These conditions were the following: 
a just and lasting agreement must be based on United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which enshrine the principle of land for 
peace. It should provide for the security of all states in the region, 
including Israel, within recognized and guaranteed borders, and for the 
Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination; 
all parties must commit themselves within the peace process to refraining 
from all acts of violence and avoiding any action likely to endanger the 
negotiations or to threaten the climate of confidence. The Israeli 
Government and the Arab parties should act quickly to implement confidence-
building measures; • 
there should be a halt to the building and expansion of Israeli settlements 
in the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem, which are illegal 
under international law. The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
should be fully applied. The European Council also called upon members of 
the Arab League to lift the boycott of trade to Israel, which is 
incompatible with the spirit of the peace process. 
19. The Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO on 13 September 
1993 is an important step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East. It should, in principle, lead the League of Arab States to 
lift the boycott, which is incompatible with the establishment of regional 
economic cooperation, as provided for in the Declaration, the possible outcome 
of which could be the setting-up of a common market betwen the States of the 
region. 
As regards the boycott itself, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
wishes to affirm certain principles which must guide the Community's actions in 
relation to the Arab boycott. 
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(a) The primary boycott imposed by the Arab States against Israel is a weapon 
of war authorized by GATT. It is not to be condemned in itself as long as 
a state of war exists between the parties. It is up to the parties to put 
an end to the boycott either at the close of the peace process or as a 
confidence-building measure within the framework of the peace process. As 
mentioned above, this boycott is an anachronism in the light of the 
Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993. 
(b) The secondary boycott, which aims to prevent firms from third countries 
trading with Israel, is an attack upon free trade and is therefore contrary 
to international law. The Commission could set out very clear principles 
and propose anti-boycott legislation to the Council, provided such 
legislation is deemed to be politically suitable. As the European Union 
is prepared to play a constructive and active role in the Middle East peace 
process, particularly in promoting regional cooperation between the parties 
concerned, it could persuade the Arab countries to put an end to 
discriminatory measures against Community firms. 
(c) The tertiary boycott and, more particularly, the fourth-degree boycott are 
unacceptable. The Council must reiterate this position in the cooperation 
councils set up under the cooperation agreements concluded between the 
European Community and the Arab countries; in particular, it should 
condemn any type of racist allusion. 
20. The two sides -Arab and Israeli - re~ently took a decisive and courageous 
step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The Declaration of 
Principles of 13 September 1993, in particular, has opened up the possibility 
of a settlement of the Palestinian question which respects Israel's right to 
exist. This initial agrement must now be followed by further agreements between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours to put an end to 46 years of war. The use of 
force must be replaced by regional cooperation for the benefit of the 
communities concerned. This will also be the best means of combating the 
fundamentalist movements which are gaining ground in the region, since Islamic 
fundamentalism breeds on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the resulting 
frustrations and material and moral poverty, especially in the refugee camps . 
• 21. Bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion will require further 
patience and courage. However, there is now a genuine possibility of putting an 
end to the war in this region of the Middle East and tackling the real problems 
such as overpopulation, economic underdevelopment (whose corollary is the rise 
of religious fundamentalism) and the management of water resources. The Arab 
boycott therefore appears to be a complete anachronism in this new geo-politcal 
perspective, as Israel and its Arab neighbours must instead pool their resources 
and their know-how ~o work together to develop the Middle East region which was 
formerly so wealthy and formed the cradle of civilization. 
22. Lifting the boycott would be an important gesture by the League of Arab 
States towards not only Israel but also the Palestinians who, in the 
transitional stage which has now opened and will continue until the final 
settlement of the Palestinian question, will have to cooperate with Israelis in 
all areas - including the economy - to implement the Declaration of Principles 
of 13 September 1993. Indeed, rather than simply a political gesture, a 
decision to lift the Arab boycott will be seen as a sign of willingness of Arab 
League countries to make the Middle East a region where peace will have finally 
triumphed over the use of force. 





MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (B3-1076/91) 
tabled pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by the following Members: PRAG, DIEZ DE RIVERA, ICAZA, HABSBURG, PROUT, BEUMER, 
FONTAINE, DE VRIES, BERTENS, FORD and MAHER 
on the Arab economic boycott of Israel 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas twelve Arab League countries maintain an economic boycott of Israel 
under which, inter alia, they refuse to trade with Israel (primary 
boycott); prohibit trade with firms in non-Arab countries, which do 
business with Israel (secondary boycott); blacklist anyone doing business 
with blacklisted firms (tertiary ~oycott); and ask firms wishing to trade 
with them whether any of their members are Zionists, 
B. whereas exercise of the boycott produces self-evident restriction and 
distortion of competition between the Member States, 
C. noting that the secondary and tertiary boycotts are 'entirely contrary to 
the spirit and letter of the agreements concluded by the Community with the 
Maghreb and Mashreq countries' 1 , 
D. whereas the EEC Treaty requires that the common commercial policy be based 
on uniform principles, and that the Commission recommend the methods for 
the requisite cooperation between Member States, 
1. Regards as an unacceptable interference in EC affairs the boycott's 
secondary and tertiary aspects; 
2. Regrets the wide variation in adequacy, and effectiveness, of the 
legislation of some Member States in this respect, and the total absence 
of legislation in most Member States; 
3. Considers this situation unacceptable in a Community responsible for a 
common external trade policy; 
4. Totally rejects the discrimination of race and religion which the boycott 
produces; 
5. Calls on the Commission to propose measures outlawing and effectively 
combating all the unacceptable aspects of the boycott. 
Claude Cheysson (then Commissioner) in April 1985 
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